


# Regulatory Safety Culture: International Perspective

*NEA/CNRA/CSNI/CRPPH Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements of the Safety Culture of the Regulatory Body*  
*3 June 2015, Paris*



Greg Rzentkowski, Director  
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety  
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security  
International Atomic Energy Agency



**IAEA**

International Atomic Energy Agency

# Outline




- Evolution of Definition of Safety Culture
- Safety Culture in IAEA Safety Documents
  - Safety Standards and TECDOCs
  - IAEA Reports
  - Key Messages
- Safety Culture as reflected in Integrated Regulatory Review Services missions
  - The IRRS Process
  - IRRS Observations
- Conclusions



# EVOLUTION OF SAFETY CULTURE DEFINITION

# Introduction of the notion of SC




## INSAG-1 (1986)

- “ ... formal procedures must be properly reviewed and approved and must be supplemented by the creation and maintenance of a ‘*nuclear safety culture*’ “

## INSAG-4 (1991)

- “*Safety Culture* is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, *nuclear plant safety issues* receive the attention warranted by their significance”.

# IAEA Glossary (2007)



*“**Safety Culture** is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, **protection and safety issues** receives the attention warranted by their significance”*




# SAFETY CULTURE IN IAEA SAFETY DOCUMENTS

# Hierarchy of related IAEA safety standards



# IAEA Standards and Documents on SC




- **GSR Part 2:** *Leadership of Management for Safety* – to replace GS-R-3 (under approval)
- **Safety Reports**
- **TECDOCs**
- Under development:
  - Safety Culture in The Regulatory Body
  - Guidelines on Safety Culture Self-Assessment for the Regulatory Body





# IAEA Reports



## *Strengthening Nuclear Regulatory Effectiveness in the light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (2013)*

### SC-related conclusions:

- The **establishment of an enduring safety culture** remains essential and regulatory bodies should take the necessary actions in this direction.
- The **high level commitment** of Member States **to peer reviews** ... has to be maintained and enhanced.
- Regulatory bodies should foster an environment that **encourages licensees to invest in improvements** beyond national requirements

# Executive Summary of Fukushima Report\*



- In order to ensure effective regulatory oversight of the safety of nuclear installations, it is essential that the regulatory body is independent and possesses legal authority, technical competence and a **strong safety culture**
- In order to **promote and strengthen safety culture**, individuals and organizations need to continuously challenge or re-examine the prevailing assumptions about nuclear safety and the implications of decisions and actions that could affect nuclear safety
- A **systemic approach to safety** needs to consider the interactions between human, organizational and technical factors. This approach needs to be taken through the entire life cycle of nuclear installations

\* The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/26

# Key Messages



**Safety culture** is a subset of the culture of the whole organization, comprising the mix of shared values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour.

Organizations typically go through a number of phases in developing and strengthening **safety culture**:

- First, safety is compliance driven and is **based mainly on rules and regulations** (compliance with externally imposed rules and regulations considered adequate for safety).
- Next, good safety performance becomes an organizational goal and is dealt with primarily in terms of **safety targets or goals**.
- Lastly, safety is seen as **a continuing process of improvement** to which everyone can contribute.

**The systemic approach to safety** addresses the whole system by considering the dynamic interactions within and among all relevant factors (individual, technical and organizational).



# SAFETY CULTURE IN IRRS MISSIONS


# Goal and objectives of IRRS

**Overall goal:**  
**To improve nuclear and radiation safety**  
and thereby  
to reduce the  
possibility of any  
safety related harm  
to people or  
environment



## Main objectives

- providing an opportunity for continuous improvement of national regulatory bodies through an integrated process of self-assessment and peer review;
- providing the host country with an objective evaluation of its regulatory infrastructure with respect to IAEA safety standards;
- providing the host country with recommendations and suggestions for improvement;
- promoting the sharing of experience and exchange of lessons learned among senior regulators;

# Structure of an IRRS mission



# Observations in IRRS Missions in countries with Nuclear Power Plants



# IRRS Observations related to SC



Photo: V. Friedrich

- In the 60 missions held in 2006-2014
- **22 findings** (Recommendation or Suggestion) and **9 Good Practices** are related to SC
  - **15 findings** relate to the SC of the **RB**, 7 findings to the oversight of the licensees' SC
  - **In GPs 5** relate to the **RB**, 4 to the licensees
  - The observations were offered in missions to **16 nuclear countries** and to **2 non-nuclear countries**



# Examples of observations



## Findings

- The RB management system (MS) should **address SC**
- The RB MS should **promote and support** a strong **SC**
- Develop and implement **SC policy**

## Good Practices

- Management promotes SC by **positive incentives**
- Open Door Policy, Non Concurrence Process, Differing Professional Opinions
- **SC training** sessions

# Conclusions



- *Safety Culture mainly assessed as an organizational factor (Management System and supporting processes and procedures).*
- *Integration of Safety Culture into Regulatory Practices and Decision Making to enhance safety performance is not clearly demonstrated.*
- *Self-assessments of Safety Culture are not performed.*



Working to Protect People, Society and the Environment

